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Recent Development 
No Satisfaction: Mellouli v. Lynch Rejects 
Deportation for Hidden Sock Pills 
Thai-Binh H. Tran* 
On June 1, 2015, the Supreme Court held in Mellouli v. Lynch that a 
Kansas drug paraphernalia conviction failed to satisfy federal 
requirements for removability.1  Federal statute permits removal2 for 
any noncitizen violating a law related to a controlled substance as 
defined in the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”).3  The 7–2 decision 
applied a strict categorical analysis to compare the Kansas and federal 
statutes concerning controlled substances.4  Justice Ginsburg, writing 
for the majority, concluded that state drug paraphernalia crimes must 
link with a particular federal drug as defined in the CSA for removal 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).5  Because the Kansas schedules of 
 
* Thai-Binh H. Tran is a Juris Doctorate Candidate, expected to graduate in May 2016 from 
Loyola University Chicago School of Law.  She thanks Debra G. Gordon, Esq., and Patrick M. 
McKenna, Esq., for their inspiring guidance and decisive brilliance in immigration law and 
procedure.  She also thanks Krishma C. Parsad, Esq., an invaluable mentor and compassionate 
advocate.  Lastly, she thanks Ben Barnett and Matt Gaspari, Editor in Chief and Editor at Large 
for Volume 47 of the Loyola University Chicago Law Journal, for this opportunity.   
1. Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1990 (2015).  “Removability” is the legal term for the 
federal government’s ability to deport a noncitizen.  See Immigration and Nationality Act 
(“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(2) (2012) (defining “removable” as “the case of an alien admitted 
to the United States” who is “deportable under section 1227 of this title.”).  This Recent 
Development uses “removability” and “deportability” interchangeably.  
2. The United States Constitution provides that immigration law and deportation or removal 
actions are the exclusive province of the federal government.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 
(authorizing Congress “to regulate commerce with foreign nations” and among the states); id. § 8, 
cl. 4 (empowering Congress “to establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization”); id. § 9, cl. 1 
(limiting immigration to persons “proper to admit”). 
3. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (“Any alien who at any time after admission has been convicted 
of a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United 
States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of title 
21), . . . is deportable.”).  The Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”), 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 (2012), 
defines “controlled substance” as “a drug or other substance, or immediate precursor, included in 
schedule I, II, III, IV, or V of Part B of this subchapter.”  § 802(6). 
4. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1987 (“The categorical approach has been applied routinely to assess 
whether a state drug conviction triggers removal under the immigration statute.”). 
5. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1990 (“[T]he Government must connect an element of the alien’s 
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controlled substances included nine controlled substances not federally 
listed under the CSA, the Court found the Kansas statute categorically 
mismatched the federal counterpart, and as such, removal was not 
triggered.6 
Yet Mellouli also left several issues unresolved.  For example, the 
Court declined to address “divisible” state statutes—e.g., a statute with 
alternative elements that are divisible into separate crimes.7  Divisible 
statutes permit a “modified” categorical analysis to show which crime 
formed the basis of conviction.8  Moreover, while Mellouli rejected a 
drug paraphernalia ruling from the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(“BIA”),9 the Court did not apply the BIA’s recent “realistic 
probability” test.10  Under the realistic probability test, a noncitizen’s 
drug conviction could still trigger removability if the federally unlisted 
 
conviction to a drug ‘defined in [§ 802].’” (quoting § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i))). 
6. Id. at 1984–88.  Several recent Supreme Court cases have declined removal for certain drug 
crimes.  See, e.g., Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013) (conviction for possession of 
marijuana with intent to distribute is not an aggravated felony); Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 
130 S. Ct. 2577 (2010) (second offense for simple drug possession that is factually distinct from 
the first conviction is not an aggravated felony for removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3)); Lopez 
v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47 (2006) (state felony drug conviction does not thereby make someone 
subject to removability, unless the conviction is also punishable as a federal felony). 
7. Id. at 1987 n.4 (“Because the Government has not argued that this case falls within the 
compass of the modified categorical approach, we need not reach the issue.”). 
8. See Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2286 (2013) (finding that only divisible 
statutes warrant a modified categorical approach and defining divisibility in terms of a statute 
with “elements” forming alternative crimes (in subsections or a disjunctive list), one of which 
does not trigger a federal consequence.).  “Elements” are facts necessary for conviction; they 
require jury unanimity for a guilty verdict.  Id. at 2284, 2286 n.3, 2290, 2296 (Alito, J., 
dissenting).  The BIA and federal circuit courts, however, have differed in their interpretation of 
Descamps’s divisibility analysis.  In Matter of Chairez, the BIA specifically defined divisibility 
in terms of jury unanimity, but on October 30, 2015, Attorney General Loretta Lynch issued an 
ordering staying Chairez and requesting amicus briefs on the issue of jury unanimity.  See Matter 
of Chairez, 26 I. & N. Dec. 686 (A.G. 2015).  Currently, each federal circuit’s interpretation of 
Descamps’s divisibility analysis trumps BIA case law.  Matter of Chairez, 26 I.& N. Dec. 478, 
481–82 (B.I.A. 2015) (deferring to individual circuits’ interpretations of divisibility under 
Descamps).  While some circuit courts have followed Chairez’s emphasis on jury unanimity to 
prove divisibility, other circuits have differed, holding that statutes are divisible so long as they 
contain alternative statutory phrases, regardless of jury unanimity.  Compare United States v. 
Rendon, 764 F.3d 1077, 1085–86 (9th Cir. 2014) (A statute is indivisible “if the jurors need not 
agree on which method of committing the offense the defendant used.”), with United States v. 
Yang, 799 F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting divisible statutes are ambiguous, containing 
imprecise “statutory phrases”), and United States v. Trent, 767 F.3d 1046, 1055 (10th Cir. 2014) 
(finding statutes containing alternative statutory phrases to be divisible). 
9. Matter of Martinez Espinosa, 25 I. & N. Dec. 118 (B.I.A. 2009), abrogated by Mellouli, 
135 S. Ct. 1980. 
10. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1988 n.8 (stating that whether the BIA’s Matter of Ferreira, 26 I. & 
N. Dec. 415 (B.I.A. 2014), correctly applied the law was “not a matter this case calls upon us to 
decide”). 
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controlled substances are not realistically prosecuted.11 
Despite these unanswered issues, the decision shows the vital 
immigration consequences stemming from statutory interpretation and 
categorical matching.12  Mellouli relied on the “categorical approach” to 
assess removability under the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(“INA”).13  This approach employs an intricate matching of state and 
federal statutes.14  A noncitizen is removable if the elements of the state 
conviction match the INA removal ground.15  No extra-statutory 
evidence or underlying facts may be considered.16  Instead, the 
approach looks to the conviction’s statutory text, and presumes the 
conviction rested on the least of the acts criminalized by statute.17 
If a conviction statute is divisible into multiple crimes involving 
removable and nonremovable conduct, the court may use a “modified 
categorical approach.”18  The modified categorical approach permits 
 
11. See, e.g., Matter of Chairez, 26 I. & N. Dec. 349, 355–57 (B.I.A. 2014) (explaining that 
the noncitizen bears the burden of proving a “realistic probability” that his statute is categorically 
overbroad, while the government bears the burden of proving divisibility for modified categorical 
analysis); Ferreira, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 419–22 (placing the burden on the alien to show a 
“realistic probability” that his conduct would fall outside of the CSA definition to “prevent the 
categorical approach from eliminating the immigration consequences for many State drug 
offenses, including trafficking crimes”); see also Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1685 
(2013) (“[T]here must be ‘a realistic probability,’ not a theoretical possibility” that the state 
would prosecute conduct outside the federal definition of a crime.’” (quoting Gonzales v. Duenas-
Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007)). 
12. See generally CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, 
IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE §§ 1.01–.02 (Matthew Bender & Co. Inc., Rev. Ed. 2014) 
(“Part of the complexity of immigration law is mechanical; it lies in the arrangement of 
provisions within the many-layered statute, and in the . . . various agencies that share in . . . 
administering . . . immigration law.”). 
13. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1986–88 (“The categorical approach ‘has a long pedigree in our 
Nation’s immigration law.’” (quoting Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1685)). 
14. See generally Alina Das, The Immigration Penalties of Criminal Convictions: 
Resurrecting Categorical Analysis in Immigration Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669 (2011); Jennifer 
Lee Koh, The Whole Better than the Sum: A Case for the Categorical Approach to Determining 
the Immigration Consequences of Crime, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257 (2012). 
15. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1986 (citing Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1684–85)). 
16. See generally IRA J. KURZBAN, KURZBAN’S IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 227 (13th 
ed. 2012) (explaining how the categorical approach looks solely to the structure of a statute rather 
than underlying circumstances). 
17. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1986–87 (the categorical approach focuses “on the legal question of 
what a conviction necessarily established”); see also Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1684 (explaining 
that categorical analysis assumes the conviction rested on the least of the acts criminalized).  But 
see, e.g., Latu v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 1070, 1076–80 (9th Cir. 2008) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing the use of the categorical approach as “counter-intuitive” where the majority found 
that a hit-and-run statute was not a crime of moral turpitude for removability); Mary Holper, The 
New Moral Turpitude Test: Failing Chevron Step Zero, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1241, 1301 (2011) 
(discussing how some courts have questioned the categorical approach as unduly formulaic 
because it requires adjudicators to “put on blinders” as to “what really happened”). 
18. See supra note 9 and accompanying text; see also Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1684–85 
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examination of limited conviction documents to determine removability 
under the INA.19  In Mellouli, however, because the government did not 
argue divisibility, the Court did not apply the modified categorical 
approach to Moones Mellouli’s paraphernalia conviction.20 
Mellouli, a Tunisian citizen, entered the United States on a student 
visa in 2004.21  He later adjusted his status to a legal permanent resident 
and became engaged to a U.S. citizen.22  In 2010, Mellouli was arrested 
for driving under the influence and for driving with a suspended 
license.23  During a post-arrest search, deputies found four orange 
Adderall pills hidden in Mellouli’s sock.24  Mellouli admitted in an 
affidavit that he did not have a prescription for Adderall.25  The 
prosecution charged Mellouli with use of drug paraphernalia—“to-wit: 
a sock, to store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise 
introduce into the human body a controlled substance.”26  He pleaded 
guilty to misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia in violation of 
section 21-5709(b) of Kansas statutes.27  This Kansas statute does not 
identify a particular drug within its text, but rather generally proscribes 
“possess[ion] with intent to use any drug paraphernalia to . . . store . . . 
or conceal . . . a controlled substance.”28 
In 2012, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement sought to 
deport Mellouli under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).29  This section 
 
(explaining that if the statute broadly defines separate crimes without identifying which crime 
formed the alien’s conviction, the court may look to the charging document, jury instructions, or 
plea agreement for instruction). 
19. Permissible documents are those within the “record of conviction,” also called the Taylor–
Shepard documents, which include jury instructions, charging documents, plea agreement, and 
transcript of the plea colloquy.  See Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005).  
20. See supra note 8; Brief for the Respondent at 16–21, Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980 
(2015) (No. 13-1034). 
21. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1984. 
22. Id. at 1985.  Mellouli obtained conditional permanent residence in 2009, and the 
conditions were lifted 2011.  Id.  For a general explanation of conditional permanent residence, 
see Conditional Permanent Residence, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., 
http://www.uscis.gov/green-card/after-green-card-granted/conditional-permanent-residence (last 
updated Jan. 14, 2011). 
23. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1985. 
24. Id.  Adderall is an amphetamine-based drug listed as a controlled substance under both 
federal and state law.  See 21 C.F.R. § 1308.12(d)(1) (2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4107(d)(1) 
(West 2015).  
25. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1985.  Mellouli’s affidavit would not be a permissible document for 
consideration under the modified categorical analysis.  See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
26. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1985; see also Brief for the Respondent, supra note 21, at 12. 
27. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1984.  
28. The statute does not identify a specific controlled substance.  See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
5709(b) (West 2015). 
29. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1985. 
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permits removal of any noncitizen “convicted of a violation of . . . any 
law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country 
relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 
21).”30  An immigration judge ordered deportation, and Mellouli 
appealed to the BIA.31  The BIA affirmed the immigration judge’s order 
and Mellouli petitioned unsuccessfully for Eighth Circuit review.32  
Notably, circuit courts will generally defer to the BIA’s reasonable 
interpretation of an ambiguous INA provision.33 
In declining review of Mellouli’s case, the Eighth Circuit deferred to 
the BIA’s precedential decision on drug paraphernalia, Matter of 
Martinez Espinoza.34  In Martinez Espinoza, the BIA analyzed drug 
paraphernalia crimes as being distinct from drug possession crimes.35  
The BIA found drug paraphernalia convictions to be deportable 
offenses, regardless of their link to federally controlled substances, 
because they “relate to” the “drug trade in general.”36  On the other 
hand, in Matter of Paulus, the BIA required state drug possession 
crimes to tie directly with federally controlled substances.37  In Paulus, 
the BIA reasoned that the possession offenses at issue referred to a 
state’s controlled substances in general but did not connect with 
 
30. 8 U.S.C § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2012) (emphasis added).  The INA provides an exception to 
removability for a “single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of 
marijuana.”  Id.  
31. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1985.  
32. Id.  The Attorney General has conferred the BIA with the power to provide, through 
precedent decisions, “clear and uniform guidance to the Service, the immigration judges, and the 
general public on the proper interpretation and administration of the Act and its implementing 
regulations.”  8 C.F.R § 1003.1(d)(1) (2015); see also BD. OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS, PRACTICE 
MANUAL ch. 1, at 1–3 (2014) (explaining the policies and functions of the BIA). 
33. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) 
(establishing a two-step analysis on whether an entrusted agency interpretation is lawful).  Under 
Chevron, a court will consider congressional intent, the ambiguity of the statutory language, and 
whether the agency adopted a permissible or reasonable interpretation.  Id.  If the statute is 
ambiguous, the court must defer to the agency’s interpretation under the second step as long as it 
is a permissible construction of the statute.  See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n. v. Brand X 
Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 984–96 (2005) (clarifying that a permissible interpretation need not 
be the best interpretation); see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226 (2000) 
(holding that Chevron deference is proper “when it appears that Congress delegated authority to 
the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation 
was promulgated in the exercise of that authority”). 
34. Mellouli v. Holder, 719 F.3d 995, 1000 (8th Cir. 2013), rev’d sub nom. Mellouli, 135 S. 
Ct. 1980; see also Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1985. 
35. Matter of Martinez Espinoza, 25 I. & N. Dec. 118, 120–22 (B.I.A. 2009) 
36. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1988 (citing Martinez Espinoza, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 121). 
37. Matter of Paulus, 11 I. & N. Dec. 274 (B.I.A. 1965)); see also Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 
1987–89 (citing Paulus, 11 I. & N. Dec. 274) (explaining that if an alien’s conviction record does 
not specify which narcotic was associated therewith, such a conviction for the sale or delivery of 
that substance will be insufficient for removal under the INA).  
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federally controlled substances.38  Hence, the BIA imposed stricter 
federal correspondence for drug possession crimes than drug 
paraphernalia crimes.39 
Considering the BIA’s disparate frameworks, the Eighth Circuit 
noted that Paulus was a pre-1970 decision, before most states mapped 
their drug schedules according to the federal schedules.40  Thus, to the 
Eighth Circuit, Paulus seemed unpersuasive in the post-1970 era where 
Kansas drug schedules aligned nearly perfectly with federal 
schedules.41  The Eighth Circuit instead found there was only a 
theoretical (rather than a realistic) probability42 that a drug offense 
would not involve a federal substance.43  As such, the Eighth Circuit 
found Mellouli’s conviction sufficiently related to a CSA controlled 
substance under Martinez Espinoza. 
Reversing the Eighth Circuit’s ruling, the Supreme Court held that 
Martinez Espinoza made “scant sense” and merited no deference.44  The 
Court found that the decision skirted the INA’s text mandating that the 
violation of law “relat[e] to a controlled substance” as defined by the 
CSA.45  Applying Paulus, the Court held that Mellouli’s conviction 
required overt relation to a federally controlled substance, rather than a 
vague reference to “controlled substances.”46  Accordingly, the Court 
declined removal, overruled Martinez Espinoza, and endorsed Paulus’s 
stricter categorical analysis. 
The Court also rejected the Government’s broad interpretation of the 
 
38. In Paulus, the BIA specifically stated that the broad California violation could include 
peyote, a drug not federally listed as a controlled substance.  11 I. & N. Dec. at 275.  
39. Compare Paulus, 11 I. & N. Dec. 274, with Martinez Espinoza, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 120. 
40. Mellouli v. Holder, 719 F.3d 995, 997 (8th Cir. 2013) (explaining that in 1970 the states 
adopted the Uniform Controlled Substances Act which was designed to complement the federal 
law and “provide an interlocking trellis of federal and state law”) (quoting UNIF. CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCES ACT (AMENDED 1994), 9 U.L.A. 5 (1990))). 
41. The 8th Circuit stated: 
The BIA’s conclusion is a reasonable interpretation of the term ‘‘relating to,’’ a term 
that reflects congressional intent to broaden the reach of the removal provision to 
include state offenses having ‘‘a logical or causal connection’’ to federal controlled 
substances.  While the “map” may be imperfect, there is nearly a complete overlap 
between the definition of controlled substance in 21 U.S.C. § 802 and in the statutes 
of States such as Kansas that adopted the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. 
Mellouli, 719 F.3d at 1000 (citation removed). 
42. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
43. Mellouli, 719 F.3d at 997. 
44. Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1989 (2015) (explaining that because the BIA’s 
interpretation “makes scant sense” it is owed no deference under the Chevron doctrine); see also 
supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
45. Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2012). 
46. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct.. at 1982–88 (“Mellouli’s conviction . . . was not confined to federally 
controlled substances . . . as opposed to a substance controlled only under Kansas law.”). 
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phrase “relating to” in Section 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).47  The Government had 
argued that such expansive federal language reached state drug offenses 
notwithstanding minor variations in state law.48  At the time of 
Mellouli’s arrest only nine out of the 306 controlled substances under 
Kansas statutes were not federally listed.49  Within a year of Mellouli’s 
arrest, two of the nine unlisted substances became federally 
controlled.50  The government contended that this significant overlap 
satisfied the INA’s “relating to” requirement.51  The government also 
observed that few states actually identify the controlled substance in 
their criminal statutes.52  Hence, requiring the state offense to explicitly 
link with a federally listed drug would severely limit the removal 
provision.53  Instead, the government argued that the INA’s broad 
“relating to” language permits removal for state drug crimes without 
demanding precise correspondence between state and federal law.54 
The Court rejected this “sweeping” interpretation that would allow 
deportation for any drug conviction bearing some general relation to a 
federally controlled substance.55  The Court restricted the INA’s 
“relating to” language to the parenthetical requiring that the controlled 
substance be “defined in” 21 U.S.C. § 802.56  Such context required the 
government to directly link the noncitizen’s conviction with a particular 
federally listed drug.57  Accordingly, the Court held that the 
government had not established removability.58 
 
47. Id. at 1989–90; Brief for the Respondent, supra note 21, at 15–17. 
48. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 21, at 15–17.  The lower court similarly stated, “[i]f 
Congress wanted a one-to-one correspondence between the state laws and the federal [schedules], 
it would have used a word like ‘involving’ instead of ‘relating to.’”  Mellouli, 719 F.3d at 1000. 
49. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 21, at 8. (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4105(d)(30) 
(West 2010)). 
50. Id. at 10. 
51. Id. at 6–9. 
52. Id. at 31 (arguing that States do not uniformly require identifying the substance to prove a 
criminal drug charge.); see also Brief Amici Curiae of the National Immigrant Justice Center & 
American Immigration Lawyers Ass’n in Support of Petitioner at 29, Mellouli v. Lynch 135 S. 
Ct. 1980 (2015) (No. 13-1034) (finding many states do not identify the substance involved in 
paraphernalia crimes).  
53. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 21, at 30. 
54. Id. at 39. 
55. Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1990–91 (2015). 
56. Id.  Many removal provisions of the INA have “relating to” language without a limiting 
parenthetical.  See infra notes 67–68 and accompanying text. 
57. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1990 (“Congress and the BIA have long required a direct link 
between an alien’s crime of conviction and a particular federally controlled drug.”).  A realistic 
probability analysis could potentially meet this “direct link” requirement.  See supra 11–12, and 
accompanying text. 
58. The government has the burden to establish removability by clear and convincing 
evidence.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A) (2012). 
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Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Alito, dissented by challenging the 
majority’s restrictive view of “relating to.”59  The dissent argued that 
the INA’s statutory scheme supported a broad interpretation of the 
phrase.60  As one example, the dissent offered, an adjacent provision 
allows removal for the sale of a weapon “which is a firearm . . . (as 
defined in section 921(a) of title 18).”61  Such syntax suggests that 
when Congress requires more specificity for removal, it replaces 
“relating to” language with more restrictive language, such as 
“involving” or “which is.”62  The dissent further criticized the 
majority’s emphasis on connecting an element of the conviction with a 
particular federal drug.63  Such a view conflates an analysis of the 
conviction and its elements, with an analysis of state law and its relation 
to federal substances.64  The dissent concluded that because state drug 
schedules often have minor deviations from the federal schedules, 
statutes generally referencing a “controlled substance” will now prompt 
removal only if the term is divisible into separately listed substances.65 
Mellouli may ultimately lead to the termination of many removal 
cases in which the state drug paraphernalia statute refers generally to a 
“controlled substance” without naming a specific substance.  It is 
unclear, however, whether Mellouli’s ruling applies to other INA 
provisions containing identical66 or similar “relating to” language.67  
 
59. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1991–95 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
60. Id. at 1992 (explaining that the statute and its provisions indicate “that Congress 
understood this phrase to sweep quite broadly”); see also Brief for the Respondent, supra note 21, 
at 27–29 (finding that Congress did not use “relating to” in other removal provisions of the INA).  
But see Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1988 n.9 (majority opinion) (explaining that the dissent “shrinks to 
vanishing point” the language within § 802). 
61. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1992 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C)). 
62. Id. at 1993 (“[The surrounding provisions] reveal that when Congress wanted to define 
with greater specificity the conduct that subjects an alien to removal, it did so by omitting the 
expansive phrase ‘relating to.’”).  See generally KURZBAN, supra note 17, at 226 (explaining how 
the term “involving” suggests necessity while “relating to” suggests the broadest sense). 
63. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1993–94 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
64. Id. (contending that the majority did not properly account for the removal provision’s text 
due to the fact that “it looks at whether the conviction itself necessarily involved a substance 
regulated under federal law” as opposed to “whether the state related to one”). 
65. Id. (“For unless the Court ultimately adopts the modified categorical approach for statutes, 
like the one at issue here, that define offenses with reference to ‘controlled substances’ generally, 
and treats them as divisible by each separately listed substance . . . its interpretation would mean 
that no conviction under a controlled-substances regime more expansive than the Federal 
Government’s would trigger removal.”). 
66. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (containing identical language regarding the 
admissibility of a noncitizen into the United States).  The noncitizen, however, bears the burden 
of proving their admissibility, while the government bears the burden of proving removability.  
See id. § 1229a(c)(2)(A) (requiring noncitizens seeking admission to establish that he or she is 
“clearly and beyond doubt entitled to be admitted”).  
67. The INA has a list of several “aggravated felonies” containing “relating to” language 
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Mellouli also seems to indicate that removal under Section 
1227(a)(2)(B)(i) depends on the state and federal drug schedules at the 
time of the noncitizen’s conviction, rather than at the time of arrest or 
initiation of removal proceedings.68 
Lastly, adjudicators must grapple with the decision’s unaddressed 
issues of divisibility and realistic probability.69  Mellouli declined to 
address divisibility because the government had not raised the issue.70  
In contrast, the government raised a realistic probability analysis, but 
the Court merely referenced Matter of Ferreira without further 
consideration.71  Thus, Mellouli may still permit use of this realistic 
probability test.72 
Despite the decision’s unanswered issues, Mellouli shows the 
mounting complexity of statutory interpretation in executing federal 
removal.  Yet, clarity seems vital for a swollen immigration system with 
rising litigation and limited resources.73  As such, whether the language 
 
without an “as defined in” parenthetical.  See, e.g., id. § 1101(a)(43)(K)(i) (an offense that relates 
to the owning, controlling, managing, or supervising of a prostitution business); id. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(Q) (an offense relating to a failure to appear for sentence); id. § 1101(a)(43)(S) (an 
offense relating to obstruction of justice, perjury, or bribery of a witness); id. § 1101(a)(43)(T) 
(an offense relating to a failure to appear to answer to a felony). 
68. Compare Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1988 (majority opinion) (explaining that Kansas had nine 
substances not federally listed “[a]t the time of Mellouli’s conviction”), and id. at 1993 (Thomas, 
J., dissenting) (noting that “at the time of Mellouli’s conviction” three percent of Kansas’s 
controlled substances were not federally listed), with Gousse v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 
2003) (holding that changes to the federal schedules subsequent to the date of conviction for the 
noncitizen are to be applied retroactively). 
69. See, e.g., Madrigal-Barcenas v. Lynch, 797 F.3d 643 (9th Cir. 2015).  On remand from the 
Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit held that while a drug paraphernalia crime may not 
categorically be a removable crime, the BIA must consider applying the modified categorical 
approach.  Id. at 644–45. 
70. Divisibility and a modified categorical analysis here would have failed to prove 
removability since Mellouli’s conviction record did not identify Adderall as the controlled 
substance.  See supranotes 8–9, 25–26, and accompanying text; see also Mellouli v. Holder, 719 
F.3d 995, 999 (8th Cir. 2013) (“Here, the Kansas statutes and the only documents reflecting his 
Kansas conviction that may be considered in applying the modified categorical approach did not 
identify a particular controlled substance.”). 
71. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 21, at 39–40 n.6 (“This Court has explained that 
there must be a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the State would apply its 
statute to conduct outside the definition of federal law . . . .”); see supra notes 11–12 and 
accompanying text. 
72. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text. 
73. See, e.g., Press Release, Human Rights First, TRAC Numbers Demonstrate Need for 
Immigration Court Funding to Address Worsening Backlogs (Sept. 22, 2015) (covering a newly 
released report showing that half a million cases are pending before the U.S. Immigration Courts 
and characterizing the Immigration Courts as “overwhelmed and woefully under-resourced”); see 
also U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ANNUAL REPORT: IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 
2013, at 6 fig.2 (2014) (showing the increase of removals between 2004–13), http://www.dhs.gov 
/sites/default/files/publications/ois_enforcement_ar_2013.pdf; David Noriega & Adolfo Flores, 
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of conviction satisfies removal is an urgent, rapidly evolving question 
the Court will continue to face.74 
 
 
Immigration Courts Could Lose a Third of Their Interpreters, BUZZFEED NEWS (Oct. 5, 2015 
1:19 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/davidnoriega/immigration-courts-could-lose-a-third-of-their 
-interpreters#.cdO50mpG0D. 
74. On November 3, 2015, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments on whether a state arson 
offense is removable conduct depending on the broadness of the phrase “described in” under 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2012).  See Torres v. Holder, 764 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2014) (finding a New 
York arson offense is a removable aggravated felony because the phrase “described in” does not 
require exact state-federal matching), cert. granted sub nom. Torres v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 2918 
(2015). 
